MATCH-UP venue
Freihaus building of TU Wien, 2nd floor
Wiedner Hauptstraße 8-10
1040 Wien

Public transport
Subway stop Karlsplatz (U1, U2, U4), exit Wiedner Hauptstraße
Tram stop Resselgasse (1, 62, Lokalbahn)

Registration and information desk
Location: On the 2nd floor of the MATCH-UP venue. There will be signs guiding you from the entrance of the building.
Opening times: Wednesday 13:30 to 14:15.

Presentation schedule
Duration of presentation: 20 minutes
Time for questions and turn over: 5 minutes

All talks will be held in Hörsaal 8 (lecture hall 8, 2nd floor), except for Vijay Vazirani’s keynote (shared with the MFCS conference), which will be held in Hörsaal 1 (lecture hall 1, same floor).

Program booklet with abstracts
The program including the abstracts for the talks is available as a pdf here .

24.08. Wednesday

13:30–14:15 Registration
14:15–14:30 Opening remarks
14:30–14:55 Estelle Cantillon, Li Chen and Juan Pereyra Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off?
14:55–15:20 Lars Ehlers Student-Optimal Interdistrict School Choice: District-Based versus School-Based Admissions
15:20–15:45 Bnaya Dreyfuss, Ofer Glicksohn, Ori Heffetz and Assaf Romm Incorporating Reference-Dependence Considerations in Deferred Acceptance
15:45–16:30 Coffee break
16:30–16:55 Xuan Zhang and Yuri Faenza Affinely representable lattices, stable matchings, and choice functions
16:55–17:20 Kemal Yildiz and Ahmet Alkan Modular stable matching mechanisms
17:20–17:45 Haris Aziz, Anton Baychkov and Péter Biró Cutoff stability under distributional constraints with an application to summer internship matching
17:45–19:30 Poster session

25.08. Thursday

9:00–9:25 Klaus Heeger and Ágnes Cseh Popular matchings with weighted voters
9:25–9:50 Péter Biró and Gergely Csáji Strong core and Pareto-optimal solutions for the multiple partners matching problem under lexicographic preferences
9:50–10:15 Inbal Rozenzweig, Reshef Meir and Nicholas Mattei Mitigating Skewed Bidding for Conference Paper Matching
10:15–10:40 Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, Zhe Feng, Shira Li, Jonathan Ma, Scott Kominers and David Parkes Deep Learning for Two-Sided Matching
10:40–11:10 Coffee break
11:10–11:35 Yannai Gonczarowski, Ori Heffetz and Clayton Thomas Self-Explanatory Strategyproof Mechanisms
11:35–12:00 Assaf Romm, Alvin Roth and Ran Shorrer Stability vs. No Justified Envy
12:00–12:25 Ran Shorrer and Sandor Sovago Dominated Choices in a Strategically Simple College
12:25–14:00 Lunch break
14:00–15:00 Keynote: Vijay Vazirani
Note: Different from the other talks, will be held in Hörsaal 1 (lecture hall 1).
Online Bipartite Matching and Adwords
15:10–15:35 Danny Blom, Bart Smeulders and Frits Spieksma Rejection-proof Kidney Exchange Mechanisms
15:35–16:00 Péter Biró, Flip Klijn, Xenia Klimentova and Ana Viana Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets: Respecting Improvement, Integer Programming, and Kidney Exchange
16:00–16:30 Coffee break
16:30–16:55 Josue Ortega and Thilo Klein Improving Efficiency and Equality in School Choice
16:55–17:20 Rupert Freeman, Geoffrey Pritchard and Mark Wilson Order Symmetry: A New Fairness Criterion for Assignment Mechanisms
17:20–17:45 Daniel Kornbluth and Alexey Kushnir Undergraduate Course Allocation through Pseudo-Markets
17:45–18:15 Group photo in front of the main university building (Karlsplatz)
18:30–22:00 Bus ride to and dinner at Heuriger

26.08. Friday

9:00–10:00 Keynote: Sophie Bade
Held in Hörsaal 8 (lecture hall 8).
A procession of Royals: Incentives, Efficiency and Fairness in Two-sided Matching
10:00–10:25 Nick Arnosti, Carlos Bonet and Jay Sethuraman A Systematic Approach to Selection Problems
10:25–10:50 Di Feng, Bettina Klaus and Flip Klijn A Characterization of the Coordinate-Wise Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets
10:50–11:20 Coffee break
11:20–11:45 Haris Aziz and Zhaohong Sun Multi-Rank Smart Reserves
11:45–12:10 Jean-Jacques Herings and Yu Zhou Equilibria in Matching Markets with Soft and Hard Liquidity Constraints
12:10–13:45 Lunch break
13:45–14:10 Karolina Vocke Anonymity and stability in large many-to-many markets
14:10–14:35 Kristóf Bérczi, Erika Renáta Bérczi-Kovács and Evelin Szögi A dual approach for dynamic pricing in multi-demand markets
14:35–15:00 Georgy Artemov, Yeon-Koo Che and Yinghua He Stable Matching with Mistaken Agents
15:00–15:25 Federico Bobbio, Margarida Carvalho, Andrea Lodi, Ignacio Rios and Alfredo Torrico Capacity Planning in Stable Matching: An Application to School Choice
15:25–16:00 Coffee break
16:00–16:25 Niclas Boehmer, Klaus Heeger and Stanisław Szufa A Map of Diverse Synthetic Stable Roommates Instances
16:25–16:50 Kenzo Imamura and Yasushi Kawase Efficient matching under general constraints
16:50–17:15 Zheng Chen, Bo Li, Mingming Li and Guochuan Zhang Fair Graphical Resource Allocation with Matching-Induced Utilities
17:15–17:40 Bo Li, Fangxiao Wang and Yu Zhou Maximin Share Fair Allocation of Indivisible Chores: Beyond Additive Valuations
17:40 Closing remarks

Last updated: 23.08. 17:00