Accepted papers

• Lars Ehlers: Student-Optimal Interdistrict School Choice: District-Based versus School-Based Admissions
• Josue Ortega and Thilo Klein: Improving Efficiency and Equality in School Choice
• Di Feng, Bettina Klaus and Flip Klijn: A Characterization of the Coordinate-Wise Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets
• Daniel Kornbluth and Alexey Kushnir: Undergraduate Course Allocation through Pseudo-Markets
• Karolina Vocke: Anonymity and stability in large many-to-many markets
• Péter Biró and Gergely Csáji: Strong core and Pareto-optimal solutions for the multiple partners matching problem under lexicographic preferences
• Haris Aziz and Zhaohong Sun: Multi-Rank Smart Reserves
• Ran Shorrer and Sandor Sovago: Dominated Choices in a Strategically Simple College Admissions Environment: The Effect of Admission Selectivity
• Xuan Zhang and Yuri Faenza: Affinely representable lattices, stable matchings, and choice functions
• Kemal Yildiz and Ahmet Alkan: Modular stable matching mechanisms
• Kristóf Bérczi, Erika Renáta Bérczi-Kovács and Evelin Szögi: A dual approach for dynamic pricing in multi-demand markets
• Assaf Romm, Alvin Roth and Ran Shorrer: Stability vs. No Justified Envy
• Jean-Jacques Herings and Yu Zhou: Equilibria in Matching Markets with Soft and Hard Liquidity Constraints
• Klaus Heeger and Ágnes Cseh: Popular matchings with weighted voters
• Georgy Artemov, Yeon-Koo Che and Yinghua He: Stable Matching with Mistaken Agents
• Rupert Freeman, Geoffrey Pritchard and Mark Wilson: Order Symmetry: A New Fairness Criterion for Assignment Mechanisms
• Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, Zhe Feng, Shira Li, Jonathan Ma, Scott Kominers and David Parkes: [Deep Learning for Two-Sided Matching
• Federico Bobbio, Margarida Carvalho, Andrea Lodi, Ignacio Rios and Alfredo Torrico: Capacity Planning in Stable Matching: An Application to School Choice
• Péter Biró, Flip Klijn, Xenia Klimentova and Ana Viana: Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets: Respecting Improvement, Integer Programming, and Kidney Exchange
• Haris Aziz, Anton Baychkov and Péter Biró: Cutoff stability under distributional constraints with an application to summer internship matching
• Kenzo Imamura and Yasushi Kawase: Efficient matching under general constraints
• Danny Blom, Bart Smeulders and Frits Spieksma: Rejection-proof Kidney Exchange Mechanisms
• Niclas Boehmer, Klaus Heeger and Stanisław Szufa: A Map of Diverse Synthetic Stable Roommates Instances
• Estelle Cantillon, Li Chen and Juan Pereyra: Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off?
• Yannai Gonczarowski, Ori Heffetz and Clayton Thomas: Self-Explanatory Strategyproof Mechanisms
• Inbal Rozenzweig, Reshef Meir and Nicholas Mattei: Mitigating Skewed Bidding for Conference Paper Matching](../matchup2022-papers/80-oral.pdf)
• Bnaya Dreyfuss, Ofer Glicksohn, Ori Heffetz and Assaf Romm: Incorporating Reference-Dependence Considerations in Deferred Acceptance
• Bo Li, Fangxiao Wang and Yu Zhou: Maximin Share Fair Allocation of Indivisible Chores: Beyond Additive Valuations
• Zheng Chen, Bo Li, Mingming Li and Guochuan Zhang: Fair Graphical Resource Allocation with Matching-Induced Utilities
• Nick Arnosti, Carlos Bonet and Jay Sethuraman: A Systematic Approach to Selection Problems

Accepted posters

• Eleni Batziou, Maximilian Fichtl and Martin Bichler: Core-Stability in Assignment Markets with Financially Constrained Buyers
• Devansh Jalota, Michael Ostrovsky and Marco Pavone: Matching with Transfers under Distributional Constraints
• Ildikó Schlotter and Ágnes Cseh: Maximum-utility popular matchings with bounded instability
• Girija Limaye and Meghana Nasre: Envy-free matchings with cost-controlled quotas
• Christian Basteck and Lars Ehlers: Strategy-Proof and Envy-Free Random Assignment
• Ankang Sun and Bo Li: On the Price of Fairness of Allocating Contiguous Blocks
• Robert Bredereck, Klaus Heeger, Dušan Knop and Rolf Niedermeier: Multidimensional Stable Roommates with Master List
• Kristóf Bérczi, Gergely Csáji and Tamás Király: Manipulating the outcome of stable matching and roommates problems
• Erel Segal-Halevi: Generalized Rental Harmony
• Ildikó Schlotter, Péter Biró and Tamas Fleiner: The core of housing markets from an agent’s perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home?
• Tom Demeulemeester and Juan Pereyra: Rawlsian Assignments
• Michael McKay, Ágnes Cseh and David Manlove: Envy-Free Coalitions of Fixed Size

Please prepare and print your poster in A0 vertical format.