Program

MATCH-UP venue
Freihaus building of TU Wien, 2nd floor
Wiedner Hauptstraße 8-10
1040 Wien
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Public transport
Subway stop Karlsplatz (U1, U2, U4), exit Wiedner Hauptstraße
Tram stop Resselgasse (1, 62, Lokalbahn)

Registration and information desk
Location: On the 2nd floor of the MATCH-UP venue. There will be signs guiding you from the entrance of the building.
Opening times: Wednesday 13:30 to 14:15.

Presentation schedule
Duration of presentation: 20 minutes
Time for questions and turn over: 5 minutes

All talks will be held in Hörsaal 8 (lecture hall 8, 2nd floor), except for Vijay Vazirani’s keynote (shared with the MFCS conference), which will be held in Hörsaal 1 (lecture hall 1, same floor).

Program booklet with abstracts
The program including the abstracts for the talks is available as a pdf here .

24.08. Wednesday

13:30–14:15Registration
14:15–14:30Opening remarks
14:30–14:55Estelle Cantillon, Li Chen and Juan PereyraRespecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off?
14:55–15:20Lars EhlersStudent-Optimal Interdistrict School Choice: District-Based versus School-Based Admissions
15:20–15:45Bnaya Dreyfuss, Ofer Glicksohn, Ori Heffetz and Assaf RommIncorporating Reference-Dependence Considerations in Deferred Acceptance
15:45–16:30Coffee break
16:30–16:55Xuan Zhang and Yuri FaenzaAffinely representable lattices, stable matchings, and choice functions
16:55–17:20Kemal Yildiz and Ahmet AlkanModular stable matching mechanisms
17:20–17:45Haris Aziz, Anton Baychkov and Péter BiróCutoff stability under distributional constraints with an application to summer internship matching
17:45–19:30Poster session

25.08. Thursday

9:00–9:25Klaus Heeger and Ágnes CsehPopular matchings with weighted voters
9:25–9:50Péter Biró and Gergely CsájiStrong core and Pareto-optimal solutions for the multiple partners matching problem under lexicographic preferences
9:50–10:15Inbal Rozenzweig, Reshef Meir and Nicholas MatteiMitigating Skewed Bidding for Conference Paper Matching
10:15–10:40Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, Zhe Feng, Shira Li, Jonathan Ma, Scott Kominers and David ParkesDeep Learning for Two-Sided Matching
10:40–11:10Coffee break
11:10–11:35Yannai Gonczarowski, Ori Heffetz and Clayton ThomasSelf-Explanatory Strategyproof Mechanisms
11:35–12:00Assaf Romm, Alvin Roth and Ran ShorrerStability vs. No Justified Envy
12:00–12:25Ran Shorrer and Sandor SovagoDominated Choices in a Strategically Simple College
12:25–14:00Lunch break
14:00–15:00Keynote: Vijay Vazirani
Note: Different from the other talks, will be held in Hörsaal 1 (lecture hall 1).
Online Bipartite Matching and Adwords
15:10–15:35Danny Blom, Bart Smeulders and Frits SpieksmaRejection-proof Kidney Exchange Mechanisms
15:35–16:00Péter Biró, Flip Klijn, Xenia Klimentova and Ana VianaShapley-Scarf Housing Markets: Respecting Improvement, Integer Programming, and Kidney Exchange
16:00–16:30Coffee break
16:30–16:55Josue Ortega and Thilo KleinImproving Efficiency and Equality in School Choice
16:55–17:20Rupert Freeman, Geoffrey Pritchard and Mark WilsonOrder Symmetry: A New Fairness Criterion for Assignment Mechanisms
17:20–17:45Daniel Kornbluth and Alexey KushnirUndergraduate Course Allocation through Pseudo-Markets
17:45–18:15Group photo in front of the main university building (Karlsplatz)
18:30–22:00Bus ride to and dinner at Heuriger

26.08. Friday

9:00–10:00Keynote: Sophie Bade
Held in Hörsaal 8 (lecture hall 8).
A procession of Royals: Incentives, Efficiency and Fairness in Two-sided Matching
10:00–10:25Nick Arnosti, Carlos Bonet and Jay SethuramanA Systematic Approach to Selection Problems
10:25–10:50Di Feng, Bettina Klaus and Flip KlijnA Characterization of the Coordinate-Wise Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets
10:50–11:20Coffee break
11:20–11:45Haris Aziz and Zhaohong SunMulti-Rank Smart Reserves
11:45–12:10Jean-Jacques Herings and Yu ZhouEquilibria in Matching Markets with Soft and Hard Liquidity Constraints
12:10–13:45Lunch break
13:45–14:10Karolina VockeAnonymity and stability in large many-to-many markets
14:10–14:35Kristóf Bérczi, Erika Renáta Bérczi-Kovács and Evelin SzögiA dual approach for dynamic pricing in multi-demand markets
14:35–15:00Georgy Artemov, Yeon-Koo Che and Yinghua HeStable Matching with Mistaken Agents
15:00–15:25Federico Bobbio, Margarida Carvalho, Andrea Lodi, Ignacio Rios and Alfredo TorricoCapacity Planning in Stable Matching: An Application to School Choice
15:25–16:00Coffee break
16:00–16:25Niclas Boehmer, Klaus Heeger and Stanisław SzufaA Map of Diverse Synthetic Stable Roommates Instances
16:25–16:50Kenzo Imamura and Yasushi KawaseEfficient matching under general constraints
16:50–17:15Zheng Chen, Bo Li, Mingming Li and Guochuan ZhangFair Graphical Resource Allocation with Matching-Induced Utilities
17:15–17:40Bo Li, Fangxiao Wang and Yu ZhouMaximin Share Fair Allocation of Indivisible Chores: Beyond Additive Valuations
17:40Closing remarks

Last updated: 23.08. 17:00