Jiehua Chen

A preference profile with $m$ alternatives and $n$ voters is $d$-Manhattan (resp. $d$-Euclidean) if both the alternatives and the voters can be placed into the $d$-dimensional space such that between each pair of alternatives, every voter prefers the one which has a shorter Manhattan (resp. Euclidean) distance to the voter. Following Bogomolnaia and Laslier [Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2007] and Chen and Grottke [Social Choice and Welfare, 2021] who look at $d$-Euclidean preference profiles, we study which preference profiles are $d$-Manhattan depending on the values $m$ and $n$. First, we show that each preference profile with $m$ alternatives and $n$ voters is $d$-Manhattan whenever $d \geq \min(n, m-1)$. Second, for $d = 2$, we show that the smallest non $d$-Manhattan preference profile has either three voters and six alternatives, or four voters and five alternatives, or five voters and four alternatives. This is more complex than the case with $d$-Euclidean preferences (see [Bogomolnaia and Laslier, 2007] and [Bulteau and Chen, 2020].

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The full version of the paper can be found on arXiv.